In my opinion, running a script that does stuff internally with sudo is wrong. A better approach is to have the user run the whole script with sudo, and have the script fork lesser-privileged children to do stuff:
# Drops privileges to that of the specified user
def drop_priv user
Process.initgroups(user.username, user.gid)
Process::Sys.setegid(user.gid)
Process::Sys.setgid(user.gid)
Process::Sys.setuid(user.uid)
end
# Execute the provided block in a child process as the specified user
# The parent blocks until the child finishes.
def do_as_user user
unless pid = fork
drop_priv(user)
yield if block_given?
exit! 0 # prevent remainder of script from running in the child process
end
puts "Child running as PID #{pid} with reduced privs"
Process.wait(pid)
end
at_exit { puts 'Script finished.' }
User = Struct.new(:username, :uid, :gid)
user = User.new('nobody', 65534, 65534)
do_as_user(user) do
sleep 1 # do something more useful here
exit! 2 # optionally provide an exit code
end
puts "Child exited with status #{$?.exitstatus}"
puts 'Running stuff as root'
sleep 1
do_as_user(user) do
puts 'Doing stuff as a user'
sleep 1
end
This example script has two helper methods. #drop_priv takes an object with username, uid, and gid defined and properly reduces the permissions of the executing process. The #do_as_user method calls #drop_priv in a child process before yielding to the provided block. Note the use of #exit! to prevent the child from running any part of the script outside of the block while avoiding the at_exit hook.
Often overlooked security concerns to think about:
- Inheritance of open file descriptors
- Environment variable filtering
- Run children in a chroot?
Depending on what the script is doing, any of these may need to be addressed. #drop_priv is an ideal place to handle all of them.
与恶龙缠斗过久,自身亦成为恶龙;凝视深渊过久,深渊将回以凝视…