One thing that hasn't been mentioned is that interchanging signed/unsigned numbers can lead to security bugs. This is a big issue, since many of the functions in the standard C-library take/return unsigned numbers (fread, memcpy, malloc etc. all take size_t
parameters)
For instance, take the following innocuous example (from real code):
//Copy a user-defined structure into a buffer and process it
char* processNext(char* data, short length)
{
char buffer[512];
if (length <= 512) {
memcpy(buffer, data, length);
process(buffer);
return data + length;
} else {
return -1;
}
}
Looks harmless, right? The problem is that length
is signed, but is converted to unsigned when passed to memcpy
. Thus setting length to SHRT_MIN
will validate the <= 512
test, but cause memcpy
to copy more than 512 bytes to the buffer - this allows an attacker to overwrite the function return address on the stack and (after a bit of work) take over your computer!
You may naively be saying, "It's so obvious that length needs to be size_t
or checked to be >= 0
, I could never make that mistake". Except, I guarantee that if you've ever written anything non-trivial, you have. So have the authors of Windows, Linux, BSD, Solaris, Firefox, OpenSSL, Safari, MS Paint, Internet Explorer, Google Picasa, Opera, Flash, Open Office, Subversion, Apache, Python, PHP, Pidgin, Gimp, ... on and on and on ... - and these are all bright people whose job is knowing security.
In short, always use size_t
for sizes.
Man, programming is hard.